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SUBMISSIONS UNDER THE NAAEC 
INTRODUCTION
The North American Agreement on Environmental Coope
(NAAEC) is a side-agreement to the North American Free 
Agreement (NAFTA), to which the United States, Canada, and M
are signatory parties (Parties). A central feature of the NAAEC
citizen submission on enforcement matters (SEM) process, by 
citizens and citizen groups from any of the three signatory countries can
call on the NAAEC Secretariat to consider whether a P
fectively enforce its environmental laws. To date, there have 
eighty-one citizen submissions filed against the three Parties.1
Much of the scholarship surrounding the SEM process
non-governmental organizations.  In contrast, there has been rela
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John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an 
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1 Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPE
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=751&SiteNodeID=250 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
2 E.g., JONATHAN GRAUBART, LEGALIZING TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE STRUG
GAIN SOCIAL CHANGE FROM NAFTA’S CITIZEN PETITIONS (2008); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON 
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 V, we analyze Canada’s responses through three theoretical 





objectives include “the protection and improvement of the 
 and 
little work done that seeks to understand the manner in which the P
have interacted with this innovative SEM process. To assess wheth
to what extent the SEM process is working, and to envision ways th
process (or analogous ones) might be improved, it is important to 
better understanding of how governments perceive and react to proc
of t
ea.
For this Article, we examined only SEM submissions a
Canada. We used a case-study approach, selecting three cases that
illustrate any trend in the Canadian government’s response to 
su 3bmissions.  We then sought to understand Canada’s responses th
three theoretical perspectives: realism, pluralism, and institutionalism
We begin by briefly describing the NAAEC and the SEM proc
Part II. Part III lays out three cases in which submitters alleged
Canada had failed to effectively enforce its environmental law
Canada’s responses to each of them. This is followed in Part IV
discussion of trends in Canada’s responses arising from the case st
In Part
research.
II. THE NAAEC & THE SEM PROCESS
The NAAEC arose as a response to criticisms by environm
groups during the negotiations for NAFTA. Environmental groups 
concerned that NAFTA would drive Canadian and American comp
to Mexico, where they could take advantage of more le
environmental standards.4 The result was a side agreement whose
environment”5 and the enhancement of “compliance with,




ments can also respond to SEM submissions 
throu factual r ticle
’s policy 
standing of which is also an important 
part of the bigger picture, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
4 Knox & Markell, supra note 2, at 510. 
5 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 1(a), U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
kell, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation After Ten Years: Lessons 
About Institutional Structure and Public Participation in Governance, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L. &
L. REV. 341 (2004); Isabel Studer, The NAFTA Side Agreements: Toward a More Cooperative 
Approach?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 469 (2010). 
3 This Article is limited to an analysis of the Canada’s “Party Responses” 
submissions as described in Part II. Of course, govern
gh policy or legislative changes after the release of a ecord. However, this Ar
examines the behaviour of Canada as an actor within the SEM process. Therefore, Canada
and legislative response outside the SEM process, the under
2
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 with the development of a factual record.19
To date, there have been thirty-one SEM submissions against 
Ca
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations.”6 Article 5 
that “each Party shall effectively enforce its environmental law
regulations throug 7
me into effect on January 1, 1994.8
The NAAEC established the Commission for Environm
Cooperation (CEC), which consists of a Council, a Secretariat, 
Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).9 The Council is the gove
body of the CEC, and is made up of cabinet-level representatives
the three Parties.10 The Council meets annually in regular session, a
special session at the request of any Party.11 The Secretariat pro
technical, administrative, and operational support to the Council,
headed by an Executive Director appointed by the Council for a 
year term.12 Each Party may appoint three members to the fif
member JPAC, which provides advice to the Council and information to 
th 13e Secretariat.  Each Party may also convene its own Na
Advisory Committee (NAC) consisting of members of its public.14
A hallmark feature of the NAAEC is its SEM process. Article 1
allows the Secretariat to “consider a submission from any 
governmental organization or person asserting that a Party is fail
effectively enforce its environmental law.”15 If the submission m
certain screening criteria, the Secretariat can request a response from
Party in question.16 Normally, the Party will have thirty da
respond.17 Article 15 allows the Secretariat to recommend to the Co
that a submission warrants the development of a factual record.






(1), (4), (5). 
.
(1). 
17 Id. art. 14(3). 
18 Id. art. 15(1). 
19 Id. art. 15(2). 
20 Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Canada, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
6 Id. art. 1(g). 
7 (1).  Id. art. 5
8 Id. art. 47. 
9 Id. art. 8. 
10 1), 10(1) Id. art. 9(
11 Id. art. 9(3)
12 Id. art. 11
13 Id. art. 16
14 Id. art. 17
15 Id. art. 14
16 Id. art. 14(2). 
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y brief description of the Secretariat’s factual 
finding in each case for completeness, as the Secretariat’s findings are 











asserted that the Canadian government had failed to enforce section 
21 ederal 
ed to 
Terminated due to not having met the criteria for prope
submission: twelve; 
Secretariat is reviewing the submission: thr
Secretariat is reviewing the Party response: two; 
Secretariat has reco
record: three; 
Council has voted not to develop factual record
Submitter withdrew from the SEM proces
I. CASE STUDIES INVOLVI
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
In this Part, we explore three case studies involving Can
government responses to Article 14 submissions: BC Hydro (SEM
001), Ontario Logging I & II (SEM-02-001 & SEM-04-006), and
and Paper (SEM-02-003). To provide the context for Can
responses, synopses of the submissions themselves are also pres
We only provide a ver
not relevant to
A. BC HYDRO
On April 2, 1997, the Canadian-based Sierra Legal Defence 
(now Ecojustice) and the United States-based Sierra Club Legal De
Fund (now Earthjustice) jointly filed the first major SEM submis
against Canada under Article 14 of the NAAEC. The submission, kn
as BC Hydro, was filed on behalf of a cross-border coalition of Can
and American environmental groups: B.C. Aboriginal Fish
Commission, British Columbia Wildlife Federation, Trail Wi
Association, Steelhead Society, Trout Unlimited (Spokane Cha
Sierra Club (United States), Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherm
Association, and Institute for Fisheries Resources. The subm
35(1) of the federal Fisheries Act  and section 119.06 of the f
National Energy Board Act (NEB Act),22 and in doing so fail
www Nov. 20, 
2013). The listed numbers add up to only thirty, because two of the submissions have been 
consolidated by CEC Council Resolution 05-04. 
21 Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.). 
22 National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7, s. 119.06, amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 94 
.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=546&BL_ExpandID=502 (last visited 
4
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fish habitat.”28 Section 35(1) of the Fisheries Act states that “[n]o person 
shall carry on any work . . . that results in the harmful alteration, 
protect fish and fish habitat from environmental damage caused b
droelectric power development in the province of British Columb
Although BC Hydro was not the first SEM submission a
Canada, it was the first that represented a serious challenge again
Canadian government through the SEM process of the NAAEC. Th
submission that predated BC Hydro was Oldman River I, in which The 
Friends of Oldman River claimed that the Canadian governmen
failed to effectively enforce certain provisions of the federal Can
Environmental Assessment Act24 and the Fisheries Act.25 In O
River I, the submitter’s description of the alleged failures to enforc
somewhat vague and limited. Ultimately, the Secretariat recomm
against developing a factual record because the matter at issue w
subject of an ongoing judicial proceeding.26
In contrast to Oldman River I, the submitters in BC Hydro pro
a more robust description of Canada’s alleged failures to enfor
habitat protection laws. The submitters’ main argument was
pronged. The first prong was that while B.C. Hydro had “consis
and routinely violated section 35(1) [of the Fisheries Act],” the Can
government had laid only two cha
d well documented evidence that Hydro’s operations have dam
fish habitat on numerous occasions.”27
B.C. Hydro is a Crown corporation, wholly owned by the Pro
of British Columbia, and responsible for the development
maintenance of hydroelectric power infrastructure within much 
province. The submitters claimed that B.C. Hydro’s regular operati
hydroelectric dams “causes consistent and substantial damage to fish
(Can.).
nmental
eration Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Co ble at
12, c. 19, s. 66 
(Ca
merican 
ission, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/96-
003/0 .cec.org/Storage/88/8478_96-3-RSUB-E.PDF. 
mm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/96-003/12/15(1) (Apr. 2, 
1997), available at www.cec.org/Storage/66/6019_96-3-DET-OE3.pdf. 
27 BC Hydro Submission, supra note 23, at 1. 
28 Id.
23 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission to the Commission on the Enviro
Coop
operation, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/01/SUB (Apr. 2, 1997), availa
www.cec.org/Storage/83/7858_ACF756.pdf [hereinafter BC Hydro Submission].
24 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, repealed by 20
n.).
25 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, The Friends of the Oldman River: North A
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Article 14 Subm
4/RSUB (Oct. 8, 1996), available at www
26 Co
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province from which the electricity is exported.”
The submitters alleged that the NEB failed its obligation to consider 
the despite the 
disruption or destruction of fish habitat,”29 and section 40(1) mak
contravention of section 35(1) an offence. The term “harmful alteration, 
disruption or destruction of fish habitat” is also known as “HADD.
submitters argued that B.C. Hydro’s operation of dams was ca
HADD in at least seven ways: 1) reduction in stream flow, 2)
changes in flow, 3) inadequate flushing flows, 4) altered water
trainment of fish, 6) flow diversion, and 7) reservoir drawdown.30
According to the submission, both B.C. Hydro and the Can
government were aware of these Fisheries Act violations, but C
failed to enforce the law. The submitters quoted various documen
tended to confirm that B.C. Hydro was aware its operations violate
Fisheries Act.31 Aside from this evidence, the submitters also pro
specific evidence of six instances in which B.C. Hydro, the re
federal authorities, or both were aware that dam operations harmed fish 
and fish habitat.32 Nevertheless, the submitters claimed that the Can
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (now Fisheries and Oceans Canada), 
the federal authority responsible for the administration of the Fis
Act, had laid only two charges against B.C. Hydro desp
erwhelming evidence of [B.C.] Hydro’s violations of [the Act]
the clear evidence of a decline in fish populations and habitat.”33
The second prong was that the federal National Energy B
(NEB) had failed to consider the environmental impact of electr
exportation contrary to the NEB Act.34 The NEB is responsibl
making recommendations to the Canadian government rega
applications for electricity export. The NEB Act provides a list of f
that the NEB must consider when making such recommenda
including “the impact of the exportation on the environment.”35 It 
provides that the NEB should “avoid the duplication of measures
in respect of the exportation by the applicant and the government 
36
 impact of electricity exportation on fish and fish habitat 
29 Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.). 
dro Submission, supra note 23, at 3-4. 
t 6-7.
reek, 3) 
stoke Dam, 4) Cheakamus River, 5) Shuswap Falls Project, and 6) Downton Lake. Id. at 5-6. 
. at 10.
34 Id. at 1. 
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compliance strategies such as emergency response and monitoring,43
Regional Technical Committees,44 provincial Water Use Planning 
(W lity Guidelines.46
lack of applicable provincial laws. They also challenged NEB’s 
that the province was “actively regulating the activity at issue,” 
“[ninety-three percent] of the [provincial] water licenses held by 
Hydro make no provision for the rele
cessary to conserve fish populations.”37
On July 21, 1997, the Canadian government filed its Party Res
arguing that a factual record was unwarranted.38 Canada raised s
threshold objections, including that the matter in question was the s
of pending judicial and administrative proceedings, and that the all
enforcement failures arose prior to the NAAEC’s coming into fo
However, Canada’s principal argument was that the NA
contemplated a different and a much broader concept of enforce
than what the submitters had relied upon in their submission. Acco
to Canada, the “submission fail[ed] to appreciate the comprehe
approach recognized in Article 5 and followed by Canada,” and
submission [was] based on a more limited view of enforcement, w
equate[d] enforcement directly with legal and judicial sanction
Furthermore, Canada asserted that it used “a range of compl
activi
gal and judicial sanctions,” to effectively enforce its environm
laws.40
In support of this argument, Canada described in comprehe
detail the federal regulatory regime relating to the protection of fish and
fish habitat. In so doing, Canada underscored that the NAAEC shou
interpreted in a way that allows each Party to make its own determin
of how best to enforce its domestic environmental laws.41 To this
Canada situated its national fish habitat protection regime within
larger context of the federal government,42 broader enforcement an
UP) Initiative,45 and Water Qua
ydro Submission, supra note 23, at 11. 
’n for Envtl. Cooperation, BC Hydro—Party Response, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/97-
001 y 21, 1997), available at www.cec.org/Storage/87/8430_97-1-RSP-E.PDF. 
2.
6-7.
43 Id. at 18. 
44 Id. at 18-19. 
45 Id. at 20-21. 




39 Id. at 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 Id. at
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relevant part that “no person shall . . . disturb, destroy or take a nest, egg, 
ne r duck shelter or duck box of a migratory bird.”52 This is 
Canada also defended itself against the specific allegatio
enforcement failures set out in the submission. These included de
rebuttals to each of the submitters’ seven allegations, a tabular expo
on the range of enforcement instruments that Canada had used to p
fish and fish habitat in streams that contain B.C. Hydro fac
t of orders and authorizations issued to B.C. Hydro since 1990.47
Canada’s line of argument regarding the interpretation
“enforcement” was favourably received by the Secretariat.
Secretariat agreed that “enforcement” should be given a broad defi
that encompasses more than prosecutions.48 Much of the Secretar
factual findings revolved around the effectiveness
process as a means to achie
. ONTARIO LOGGING I & II
The saga of Ontario Logging I & II is interesting for a vari
reasons, perhaps most notably the intervention of the Council in
SEM process, an intervention that arguably resulted in raising the burden 
of proof that submitters must meet.49 On February 4, 2002, the 
Legal Defence Fund filed a submission against Canada alleging a failure 
to enforce laws protecting migratory bird nests from clear-cut lo
operations in the province of Ontario.50 The submission was file
behalf of the following groups: Canadian Nature Federation, Can
Parks and Wilderness Society, Earthroots, Federation of O
Naturalists, Great Lakes United, Sierra Club (United States), Sierra
of Canada, and Wildlands League. The submitters alleged that Ca
failed to “effectively enforce subsection 6(a) of the Migratory
Regulations against the logging industry in Ontario.”51
Section 6(a) of the Migratory Birds Regulations states in the 
st shelter, eide




 Commission for Environmental 
Coop ent on Environmental Cooperation,
CEC Doc. A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 4, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/7894_02-
1-sub-e.pdf [hereinafter Ontario Logging Submission].
51 Id. at 1 (citation omitted). 
52 Migratory Birds Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1035, s. 6(a) (Can.). 
47 Id. at 16-17, 22. 
48 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FINA
001), at 35 (May 30, 2000), available at www.cec.org/Storage/68/6220_BC-Hy
record_en.pdf.
49 Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 THE ENVTL. F. 34, 36-37 (2008), ava
www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/nafta-tooth-
50 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission to the
eration Pursuant to Article 14, North American Agreem
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the development of a factual record was warranted. The Council 
reasoned that the submission had been based on estimations and had 
fai t failure.60 Given these 
a regulation enacted pursuant to section 12(1) of the federal Mig
Birds Convention Act (MBCA).53 Section 13(1)(a) of the MBCA makes 
it an offence to contravene the Act or its regulations. At the time 
submission, Environment Cana
anadian Wildlife Service (CWS). 
In the province of Ontario, the provincial Ministry of Na
Resources (MNR) manages forestry activities through a 
Management Plan (FMP) for each designated forest area, called a Forest
Management Unit (FMU). According to their initial submission
submitters estimated that over 85,000 nests of migratory birds had
destroyed by clear-cut logging during 2001 in fifty-nine FMUs.54
submitters asserted that these FMPs had been prepared without rega
migratory bird protection and with little input from the fe
government.55 The submitters also alleged that the CWS was aware of 
such nest destruction, and that CWS officials called this “incid
kill.56
The submitters challenged the approach taken by the CWS i
enforcement of the MBCA. The submitters made an Acce
Information request to Environment Canada, seeking all docu
related to efforts by both Environment Canada and the CWS to en
section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird Regulations. This request revealed that 
no investigation or charges against Ontario’s logging industry had
made in 2001.57 The submitters argued that the CWS had been 
that the incidental destruction of migratory bird nests was illegal, b
declined to prosecute in the belief that cooperation with industry 
yield better results.58 The submitters claimed that there was no evi
to support the belief that such a “vague strategy” was more effectiv
enforcement, and that the CWS had no authority to choose not to en
certain laws in the interest of economic gains.59
The Council initially rejected the Secretariat’s recommendatio
led to provide specific instances of enforcemen
atory Birds Convention Act, S.C. 1994, c. 22, s. 12(1) (Can.). 
o Logging Submission, supra note 50, at 5. 
.
58 Id. at 7-8. 
59 Id. at 8-9. 
60 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce 
53 Migr
54 Ontari
55 Id. at 6
56 Id. at 5. 
57 Id. at 6. 
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oved the development of factual records for both these 
submissions and instructed the Secretariat to consolidate them into one 
factual record.66
deficiencies, the Council gave the submitters 120 days to provide fu
information.61 The Council’s decision not to adopt the Secreta
recommendation drew criticism from both the JPAC and the Canadian
NAC. In an advice letter to the Government Committee dated Marc
2003, the Canadian NAC expressed concern over the Cou
interference with the independence of the Secretariat in carrying ou
mandated functions, and recommended that Canada suppor
Secretariat’s recommendation to develop a factual record.62 J
echoed this concern stating that the Council’s resolution crea
“higher evidentiary threshold” for submitters that might “ren
prohibitively difficult for citizens to participate in the process.”63
The submitters filed supplementary evidence on August 20, 20
response to the Council’s resolution. Using actual data from the M
the submitters provided more accurate assessments of the numbe
nests destroyed in forty-nine of the original fifty-nine FMUs in
submission.64 The submitters also provided information on 
additional FMUs in a separate submission (Ontario Logging II).65
Council appr


















Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce Section 6(a) of 
the Migratory Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 
(MBCA) (SEM-04-006), Council Resolution 05-04, CEC Doc. C/C.01/05/RES/04/Final (Apr. 1, 
nvention Act, 1994 (MBCA) (SEM 02-001), Council Resolution 03-05, CEC Doc. C/C
02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), available at ww
61 Id.
62 Letter from Can. Nat’l Advisory Comm. to Governmental Comm. (Mar. 17
available at www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/nac/adv032_e.htm. 
63 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Limiting the Scope of Factual Records and Revie
Operation of CE Counc  R solution 00-09 Related to rticles 14 and 15 o  the C il e A f North A
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Advice to Council 03-05, CEC Doc. J/03-05/AD
(Dec. 17, 2003), available 
ww ew.cec.org/Pag .asp?PageID=122&ContentID=1274&SiteNodeID=295&BL_ExpandID=. 
64 CANADIAN NATURE FED’N ET AL., SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION TO THE COMM
FOR ENVI
3), available at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6589_02-1-supplementary%20information_en.p
65 CANADIAN NATURE FED’N ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSIO
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Oct. 5, 2004), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/789
SUB_en.pdf.
66 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commiss
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively
Section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migrator
Convention Act, 1994 (MBCA) (SEM-02-001), Council Resolution 04-03, CEC Doc. C/C
01/RES/03 (Mar. 12, 2004), available at www.cec.org/Storage/75/6898_02-1-Res04-03
10
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of FMPs.  Second, Canada denied the submitters’ 








commitments.75 Given limited resources and broad geographic scope, 
hers.76
Canada raised three issues with the original submission pr
responding to the submitters’ allegations. First, it suggested th
submitters did not adequately pursue other civil remedies prior to m
their SEM submission.67 Second, Canada noted that the CWS had
trying to set up a meeting with several of the submitters and 
environmental organizations to discuss the enforcement of the MBC
the CWS and its overall enforcement approach.68 Canada cla
however, that the submitters had delayed the meeting until after the 
of the submission.69 Third, Canada pointed out that the us bm
contained no allegations of specific instances of enforcement failure
Canada denied that it failed to enforce section 6(a) of the Mig
Bird Regulations with respect to the logging industry in Ontario i
ways. First, Canada questioned the submitters’ estimation of the pot
impact of logging on migratory bird nests claiming that the estim
was based on scarce data.71 Canada also noted that the CWS was a
that provincial guidelines regarding forest resource licensing incl
biodiversity components, and that federal input was invited i
development 72
legation that the CWS had a sweeping policy of non-enforcement
logging sector.73
Similar to BC Hydro, Canada’s response in Ontario Lo
included a discussion and defense of the enforcement approach tak
Environment Canada and the CWS. In fact, Canada asserted again
“[e]nforcement is understood to include a broad range of activities 
inspections, investigation and prosecution to education, compli
promotion, regulation development and public reporting, am
others.”74 Canada argued that wildlife enforcement priorities 
balance public concern, conservation science, and international 
certain enforcement options would have higher priorities than ot
200 ilable at www.cec.org/Storage/75/6913_04-6-Resolution_en.pdf. 
m’n for Envtl.Cooperation, Response to Submission SEM-02-001, at 1, CEC Doc. 
A1 1/12/RSP(Apr. 11, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/88/8479_02-1-RSP-
E.p
.
. at 2. 
t 2-3.
. at 5. 
.
73 Id.
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 the CWS, including continuing attempts to create dialogue with 









efforts depended in part on complaints from the public.85 The Secretariat 
also found the CWS did “not have the resources to strictly enforce 
Canada claimed that the more appropriate enforcement approaches i
forestry sector were compliance promotion and education a
industry, rather than enforcement through the courts.77 Nevertheless, 
should compliance promotion fail, Environment Canada would co
investigations and lay charges.78 Finally, Canada noted that onl
complaint had been filed regarding section 6(a) of the Migratory
Regulations and logging in Ontario, and that Environment C
recorded and followed-up on the complaint.79
Canada received no complaint from the submitters.80
Canada also challenged the reliability of the submitters’ estima
nest destruction. It contended that the submitters failed to demon
that any logging had actually occurred during nesting seaso
migratory birds in 2001, or that any nests had been destroyed as a 
of such logging.81 It further argued that the submission was base
inappropriate assumptions, and that a factual record should be bas
allegations of specific instances rather than hypotheses.82 F
Canada offered additional information on the enforcement approach 
taken by
dustry and environmental groups regarding conservation
compliance with the MBCA.83
On the whole, the Secretariat’s factual record in this case was les
favourable to Canada than in BC Hydro. While Canada had indicate
it was focusing enforcement efforts on species with conservation pri
the Secretariat noted that information gaps still existed despite dec
worth of monitoring efforts to ascertain population data of migr
birds.84 The Secretariat found that the CWS website containe
information for the public on how and where to file complaints, 




84 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FACTUAL RECORD: ONTARIO LOGGING SUBMISSION
(SEM-02-001) & ONTARIO LOGGING II SUBMISSION (SEM-04-006), at 8 (June 2006), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/75/6907_CCE_21_english.pdf. 
85 Id. at 8-9. 
77 Id. at 8. 
78 Id. at 8-9. 
79 Id. a
80 Id.
81 GOV’T OF CAN., RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 3 (Oct. 16, 2003), availa
at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6595_02-1-PTS_en.pdf. 
82 Id. at 4. 
83 Id. at 4
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ER)  against pulp and paper mills in 
Ontario, Québec, and the Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador).
eposit
 or in 







suspended solids.90 The PPER contains an absolute prohibition on 
acutely lethal effluent, but it allows for authorized discharge of BOD 
ma  suspended solids. Schedule I describes the prescribed 
section 6(a) of the [Migratory Bird Regulations]
Our first case study (BC Hydro) marked the first time a 
submission against Canada culminated in the development of a fa
record. Our final case study represents the last time a subm
involving Canada has culminated in the preparation of a factual re
The Sierra Legal Defence Fund filed the Pulp and Paper subm
under Article 14 of the NAAEC on May 6, 2002. The submission
filed on behalf of Friends of the Earth, Union Saint-Laurent, G
Lacs, Conservation Council of New Brunswick, Ecology Action C
and Environment North. The submitters alleged that Canada had fai
effectively enforce sections 34, 36, 40, 78, and 78.1 of the f
Fisheries Act87 and sections 5 and 6 and Schedules I and II of the
and Paper Effluent Regulations (PP 88
89
Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act states: 
Subject to subsection (4), no person shall deposit or permit the d
of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish
any place under any conditions where the d
other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of th
deleterious substance may enter any such water. 
Subsection (4) allows for deposits authorized by regulation, 
“deleterious substance” is defined in section 34. Section 40(2) ma
an offence to contravene section 36(3), and sections 78 and 78.1 are the 
penalty provisions. 
The PPER states that the following mill effluents are consid
“deleterious substances” for the purposes of the Fisheries Act: a) ac
lethal effluent, b) biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) matter, an
tter and
86 Id. at 10. 
y 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.). 
88 Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations, SOR/92-269 (Can.). 
89 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 2 (May 6, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/7896_01-SUB.pdf. 
90 Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations, SOR/92-269, s. 3 (Can.). 
87 Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended b
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tool that has been effective where used.”  The submitters claimed that 
due to the lack of effective enforcement, some “free riders”—certain 
mi  few to no prosecutions—
methods for testing the level of these substances. In the event of a f
of an effluent to pass the prescribed test, Schedu
quired follow-up testing and monitoring procedures. 
The submitters alleged two categories of enforcement failure: 
failure of mill effluent to pass the prescribed deleterious substanc
and 2) the failure of mills to carry out the required follow-up when
is an effluent test failure.91 In total, the submitters alleged that ther
been more than 2,400 documented violations of federal law at m
Central and Atlantic Canada from 1995 to 2000, but that only eight m
had been prosecuted under federal law.92
The submission addressed alleged violations in each of the 
regions studied by the submitters. In Québec, the submitters a
1,093 violations from 1995 to 2000.93 In the year 2000 alone, twen
mills were supposedly responsible for 171 violations.94 In Ontario, the
submitters claimed that there had been 232 violations from 19
2000.95 They noted also that Ontario had had a pattern of 
prosecutions and fewer violations when compared to Québec and the
Atlantic provinces.96 The Atlantic provinces supposedly had 
violations from 1995 to 2000.97 However, the submitters
d obtained only partial data for certain years and no data in 199
so the number of violations might have been underestimated.98
In spite of the large number of violations, the submitters foun
from 1995 to 2000 there had been only six prosecutions under the fe
Fisheries Act in Ontario, two in the Atlantic provinces, and no
Québec, although they found five prosecutions under the provi
Québec Environmental Quality Act.99 Perhaps in anticipation o
Canadian government’s response, the submission stated that “[w]hile the 
Submitters do not simply equate prosecution (and fines) . . . 
effective enforcement, such prosecutions are an important enforc
100
lls with a large number of violations but very





97 Id. at 1. 
98 Id. at 10. 
99 Id. app. 5. 




94 Id. at 
95 Id. at 1
96 Id. a
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heir appendix, Canada provided responses only for 










willingness to cooperate, 3) extent of corrective action already taken, and 
4) enforcement actions by other government authorities.107 Finally, the
decision to proceed with prosecution ultimately rested with the Attorney 
had been allowed to operate.101
Finally, the submitters argued that the lack of enforcement
contrary to the federal government’s own Fisheries Act Ha
Protection and Pollution Prevention Provisions, Compliance 
Enforcement Policy (Compliance and Enforcement Policy).102
submitters claimed that the intent of the Compliance and Enforc
Policy was “to ensure that violators will comply with the Fisherie
within the shortest possible time, that v
all available enforcement tools are used.”103
Canada provided its Party Response to the Secretariat on Aug
2002.104 As with the previous responses, Canada provided a descri
of the federal agency’s enforcement approach, consistent wit
longstanding advocacy of a broad definition of enforcement fo
purpose of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC. The response
included an explanation of Environment Canada’s enforcement response 
in specific cases highlighted in the submission. However, out o
sixty-six mills for which the submitters had data on violations
prosecutions listed in t
e twelve mills that the submitters had specifically highlighted 
body of their submission. 
According to Canada’s response, the Compliance and Enforc
Policy directed Environment Canada officials to choose the appro
enforcement action (which ranged from warning, to inspector’s direction,
to prosecution) based on the nature of the violation, the likelihoo
achieving the desired result, and consistency in enforcement.105 Fa
that went into assessing the nature of the violation includ
seriousness of the (potential) environmental damage, 2) intent o
alleged violator, 3) repeat occurrences, and 4) attempts by the viola
circumvent enforcement.106 In considering the likelihood of achi
the desired result, factors included 1) history of complianc
101 Id. at 12. 
t 4. 
.
OV’T OF CAN., RESPONSE TO SUBMISSION SEM-02-003 (Aug. 6, 2002), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/72/6634_02-3-Rsp-e.pdf. 
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h ten warnings, 




analyze their significance in Part V. As expected, when the submissions 
have alleged specific instances of enforcement failure, Canada has 
General of Canada.108
Using the discussion of the federal agency’s enforcement app
as the policy context, Canada’s response then provided explanation
the enforcement action taken by Environment Canada at each of
twelve mills highlighted in the submission. In three insta
Environment Canada took no action because the mill in question
taken its own corrective action after effluent test failures.109 In
instances, violations were overlooked because they were d
temporary maintenance activities.110 In many cases, Environment Ca
opted to give written warnings or notices of infraction rather 
pr 111oceeding with prosecution.  Lastly, Canada declined to p
information on five mills due to ongoing investigations.112
The factual record in this case was quite limited in scope relat
the original submission. The Council instructed the Secretariat to de
a factual record only for ten mills, and only for enforcement failu
2000, except for one mill, which the Secretariat was allowed to exa
from 1996 to 2000.113 At those mills in the time period examined
Secretariat found that Environment Canada had responded to at
1,246 violations.114 According to the Secretariat’s factual fin
Environment Canada responded to these violations wit
twenty ite inspections and sam
charges laid, and no enforcement action in eleven instances.
IV. TRENDS IN CANADA’S RESPONSES TO CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS
An examination of Canada’s responses in these three cases re
some notable patterns. We will summarize these patterns here and
. at 4. 
sion for 
Assertion hat Ca a Is F iling to Effectively Enforce 
edules I 
2 (SEM-02-003),
Council Res. 03-16, CEC Doc. C/C.01/RES/16/final (Dec. 11, 2003), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/72/6640_02-3-Res_en.pdf. 
114 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FACTUAL RECORD: PULP AND PAPER SUBMISSION
26-31 (June 2006), available at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6649_SEM-02-003-FR_en.pdf.
115 Id.
108 Id




113 Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commis
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the  T nad a
Sections 34, 36, 40 78 and 78.1 of the Federal Fisheries Act and Sections 5 and 6 and Sch
and II of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations (PPER) Promulgated in 199
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Quality Guidelines. Similarly, in Pulp and Paper, Canada’s response 
described Environment Canada’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy 
relative to Fisheries Act violations at pulp mills, including the range of 
responded in kind by offering detailed denials. More intriguing, however, 
is the manner and consistency with which Canada, in all of these 
has asserted the view that the submissions are inconsistent wi
broader inte
ould adopt. 
The detail with which Canada has responded to submissio
especially evident in the BC Hydro and Pulp and Paper cases. In
Hydro, the submitters alleged seven ways in which B.C. H
operations harmed fish habitat. In response, Canada made three ge
rebuttals to these seven allegations before making specific rebuttals 
against each of them. Furthermore, Canada’s response included a ta
specific orders and authorizations issued to B.C. Hydro from 19
1997. In Pulp and Paper, Canada made detailed responses to allega
of enforcement failure at twelve mills highlighted in the submission.
Canada’s response in Ontario Logging I & II differs in this regard
the oth
legations such as targeted accusations against any particular log
company. 
The most striking trend that emerges from the case stu
however, is the manner and consistency with which Canada artic
its views on the question of how “effective enforcement” shou
interpreted, and on the proper scope of factual records. In all three c
Canada consistently took the position that “effective enforcemen
the purposes of the NAAEC meant more than the numb
prosecutions. BC Hydro was the first case in which Canada mad
argument for an expansive interpretation of “effective enforcement
included a range of enforcement options, from voluntary complianc
compliance agreements to legal and judicial sanctions. In On
Logging I & II, Canada expanded the list even further to 
spections, education, compliance promotion, regulation develop
and public reporting. Likewise, in Pulp and Paper, enforcement
defined to range from warnings, to inspector’s direction, to prosecut
In order to show that the range of enforcement options availa
federal authorities forms part of a larger enforcement framew
Canada’s responses invariably included descriptions of the rele
regulatory framework. For example, in BC Hydro Canada went to 
lengths in describing the federal regulatory regime relating t
protection of fish and fish habitat, such as Regional Tech
Committees, provincial Water Use Planning initiatives, and 
17
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liance promotion through dialogue with 
industry and environmental groups. 












ird perspective that 









absoluteness of state sovereignty may be eroded through participation in 
the international arena, because “states acting together through 
ne issues 
factors that federal officials would consider in determining
appropriate enforcement action. Likewise, in Ontario Logging I 
Canada discussed in detail the enforcement approach taken by the 
especially in the area of comp
. UNDERSTANDING C
THE ROLE OF THEORY
What explains the consistency and tenacity with which Canad
advocated for such a broad interpretation of “effective enforcem
There is no obvious reason for Canada to adopt such a stance. Can
responses could simply have consisted of replies to the specific inst
of enforcement failures that had been alleged, particularly in th
Hydro and Pulp and Paper cases. In terms of what Canada techn
needed to provide to the Secretariat, such narrow responses would
been enough. In
ecific allegations, but also pushed the Secretariat to consider the l
regulatory scheme. 
Can theory be harnessed to explain this apparent pattern? The
discussion below uses three theoretical lenses to examine this quest
realist perspective, a pluralist perspective, and an institutio
perspective. Ultimately, we conclude that it is this th
likely offers the most 
engaged with the citizen 
A. REALIST PERSPECTIVE
The realist perspective understands the behaviour of states as
driven largely by the enduring struggle to maintain sovereignty.
sovereign state exists in a competitive international environment
survival dependent on a jealous guarding of autonomous control ov
state’s affairs. Hobbes provides a popular characterization o
struggle: a state maintains the “posture of Gladiators” in order to en
that its absolute sovereignty remains unchallenged.116 Howeve
gotiated legal instruments can accede sovereignty over specified 
116 Alan Chong, Classical Realism and Tension Between Sovereignty and Intervention: 
Constructions of Expediency from Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bodin, 8 J. INT’L REL. & DEV. 257, 272 
(2005). 
18
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/5
2013] RESPONSES TO CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS 73
da’s 













the sovereign right of States to exploit their 






d regulations provide for high levels of environmental 
d
 need 
to “strive.”124 Article 5 states that “each Party shall effectively enforce its 
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental 
to a supranational institution.”117 At least in some measure, can Cana
response to
vereignty? 
Some scholars have studied the relationship between the NA
and state sovereignty.118 These studies tended to focus on the imp
the NAAEC on the sovereignty of the Parties, rather than on ho
Parties have reacted to possible intrusions on sovereignty by the 
Throughout the design and implementation of the SEM process, Parties 
“have tended to exhibit a highly protectionist approach to defending
Westphalian sovereignty.”119 However, in practice, the SEM proc
like a “fire alarm” that empowers citizens to bring negative attent
the targeted Party.120 As such, the SEM process may threaten a P
sovereignty to the extent that it “has the potential to influence a P
behaviour should it become the focus of such a submission.”121
In drafting the NAAEC, the Parties ensured that this tril
agreement impedes state sovereignty as little as possible. The prea
to the NAAEC reaffirms “
olicies.”122 Article 3 states: 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own lev
domestic environmental protection and environmental develo
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its
environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure th
laws an
protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws an
regulations.123
However, the NAAEC does not define “high” and Parties only
nty, Trade, and the Environment—The North American 
Ag
; Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen 
Su ALE J. INT’L. L. 141 (2002). 
, at 146. 
austiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. R
121 Richardson, supra note 117, at 193. 
122 NAAEC, supra note 5, pmbl. 
123 Id. art. 3. 
124 Richardson, supra note 117, at 190. 
117 Sarah Richardson, Sovereig
reement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183, 184 (1998). 
118 See, e.g., id.
bmissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 Y
119 Tollefson, supra note 118
120 Kal R
EV. 389, 390 (2004). 
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neither a separate sovereign entity nor an entity to which Canada has 
ac over, the Secretariat remains subject to the 
di cil, a body to which Canada belongs. 
action.”125 The Parties are fulfilling this commitment trilaterally th
a North Ame
ompliance.126
Turning to Articles 14 and 15, Parties retain a high level of c
over the SEM process. The Secretariat may prepare factual records onl
with the approval of the Council by two-thirds vote.127 Partie
comment on the draft factual record, and the Secretariat must incorp
those comments as appropriate into the final factual record.128 Fi
the Council e r tains the ultimate authority to decide whether to pu
factual record.129
While the foregoing demonstrates that the Parties were very al
potential threats to their sovereignty during the drafting of the NA
it is not clear that this perspective can explain the trend in Can
response to SEM submissions. The realist sovereignty perspective 
not, for example, help us understand why Canada has so consist
argued in favour of a very specific interpretation of “effe
enforcement” as opposed to merely addressing the specific allegations of 
enforcement failures. It is not clear that the former response pr
sovereignty over domestic environmental law enforcement policy
than the latter. As noted above, Parties retain significant control ov
SEM process, and factual records do not assign fault but are me
summary of factual findings. In terms of asserting domestic sovere
over the environmental law enforcement, a curt response from Canada
would have served just as well as a much lengthier one
comprehensively catalogued the relevant regulatory regimes in ques
Perhaps the limitation of this theoretical perspective in expla
Canada’s responses is partly due to its ontology. As Professor Kr
reminds us, “Realism is a theory about international politics. It 
effort to explain both the behaviour of individual states and
characteristics of the international system as a whole.”130 The conc
sovereignty is best employed to understand state-to-state behavio
this case, the actor with which Canada interacts—the Sec
ceded sovereignty. More
rection and veto of the Coun
supra note 5, art. 5(1). 
128 Id. art. 15(5), (6). 
129 Id. art. 15(7). 
130 Stephen D. Krasner, Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert, 20 
POL. THEORY 38, 39 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
125 NAAEC, 
126 Richardson, supra note 117, at 191. 
127 NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(2). 
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ternational agreement beyond 2012 at 




In a pluralist democracy, there is a marketplace of ideas and po
held by different actors or groups of actors. These actors have dif
levels of resources and influence. As a result, “the pattern of [p
policy will reflect the distribution of power and influence.”131 W
Canada’s multiparty political system, voters choose from a numb
political parties that represent different bundles of ideas and po
While policy outcomes may depend on more than whoever is in power, 
control over formal policy agency is in the hands of elected officia
Trends in public policy may then be traced by the flow of people wh
in political office. To the extent that both Canada’s stance i
interpretation of “effective enforcement,” and Canada’s respon
SEM submissions are policy, Canada’s domestic politics may offer 
explanation.
A brief look at the history of the Canadian political land
quickly dispels the usefulness of this theoretical perspective in
present case. While Canada’s responses to submissions have been
consistent over the three SEM cases, the Canadian political land
has experienced quite dramatic changes. The three cases span a ten-y
period from the April 1997 submission of BC Hydro to February 20
publication of the facutal record in Pulp and Paper. Over this de
Canadians have voted in three prime ministers from two diff
political parties: Jean Chrétien (Liberal Party of Canada (Lib.)),
Martin (Lib.), and Stephen Harper (Conservative Party of C
(Con.)). Canada has also witnessed six Ministers of the Environ
Sergio Marchi (Lib.), Christine Stewart (Lib.), David Anderson (
Stéphane Dion (Lib.), Rona Ambrose (Con.), and John Baird (Con.)
The difference in the government’s attitude to environmental 
between Stéphane Dion’s tenure as Minister of the Environmen
Rona Ambrose’s is striking. Stéphane Dion was seen as a champi
environmental causes. Through his efforts, Canada got the signator
the Kyoto Protocol to extend the in
treated from its Kyoto commitments when the new Conservative 
vernment came to power in 2006.134
131 Richard Simeon, Studying Public Policy, 9 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 548, 568 (1976). 
 Agenda 
Setting, 13 POL’Y STUD. J. 115, 118 (2005). 
133 Janice Harvey, Climate Change Conference a Victory for Multilateralism and the Earth,
TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 2005.. 
134 Allan Woods, Conservatives Won’t Be Bound by Kyoto, Ambrose Says, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
132 Charles D. Elder & Roger W. Cobb, Aging and Public Policy: The Politics of
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ough to generate different policy outcomes if the right 







.  For example, 
m ution. 
Specific institutions can be identified by “persistent sets of rules that 
constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles.”138
ed on 
Despite the changes in prime ministers and Ministers o
Environment, Canada’s attitude toward SEM submissions remained the 
same throughout. The Canadian government’s responses show
indication of a more favourable disposition toward the allegations 
submitters during the years that the Liberal Party was in office
during the years the Conservatives held the reins of power. In 
domestic politics d
 SEM submissions. 
Of course, modern scholarship recognizes that changes in do
policy result from a confluence of factors. “Policy window
opportunities to set the formal agenda—open up when issues (pro
stream) converge with institutional circumstances (politics stream
the development of policy solutions (policy stream).135 The pluralist
of policy entrepreneurs from both inside and outside governmen
take advantage of these policy windows to affect policy outco
Differences in the national leadership may bring different sets of issue
into the political foreground, such as meeting Canada’s internat




The institutionalist perspective seeks to explain the behavio
actors by understanding the boundaries of acceptable behav
imposed by the institution within which the actors exist. As a mat
definition, “institution” here refers to what Professor Keohane 
“specific institution,” which is a particular human-constructed
organized arrangement.136 This is in contrast to “general institu
which is a general pattern or categorization of activity 137
arriage is a general institution, while the CEC is a specific instit
Much of the empirical work done by institutionalists has focus
Feb. 18, 2006, at A6. 
Howlett, Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and 
Exogenous Correlates of Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting, 31 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 495, 497 (1998). 
136 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 
383 (1988). 
137 Id.
138 Id. at 384. 
135 Michael 
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 for a 
Party against whom a submission has been filed is to bring every 
argument to bear in the Party Response. Just as in a courtroom there is 
otely
how institutions are created. Theories on the conditions that allo
actors to form institutions for cooperation and compliance have for
staple of institutionalist research for quite some time.139 However,
has also been empirical work that treats institutions as the indepe
variable that may explain state behaviour.140 Insight into the re
behind the trend in Canada’s responses to SEM submis
ined by examining the rules and structure of the SEM process. 
One of the oft-repeated criticisms ofthe SEM process is tha
Parties have treated the process as an adversarial one.141 This 
surprising, given the nature of the SEM process itself. Granted, the
a few features of this process that lend themselves to encouraging
cooperative postures from the Parties. For example, the factual rec
non-binding on the Party against which the submission was made
the Council has a high degree of control over the scope of the factual 
record that the Secretariat is instructed to develop. These features
e political stakes for the Parties involved, allowing for greater pot
for cooperation. 
Ultimately, however, the SEM process more closely resemb
adversarial litigation model rather than a more cooperative mediatio
negotiation-based model. The process commences with submitters 
a complaint against a particular Party, alleging a specified fail
effectively enforce its environmental law contrary to Article 5 o
NAAEC. If the submission passes screening requirements, the Secr
gathers arguments from both sides before producing a factual re
Throughout this process, the NAAEC does not provide for the Secre
to convene with the submitters and representatives of the Party tog
to discuss their points of contention. And while the factual record is
binding on the Party, the Secretariat’s factual findings can (and 
metimes do) favour one side over the other. Thus, the function of the 
Secretariat is similar to a judge hearing argument from two opp
sides before rendering judgment. 
In such an adversarial setting, the most advantageous strategy
almost always no advantage to a party for eschewing even a rem
139 See generally Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie Johns, Formal Models of Inter
Institutions, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 221 (2012). 
national 
. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L
SECURITY 39, 48-50 (1995). 
141 Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 415, 417 (2004). 
140 Robert O
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ems likely that Canada’s strategy 




























obscured from public scrutiny. For example, during the BC Hydro 
process, the Canadian government lobbied the Council to sequester from 
the public confidential and sensitive information tendered by the 
relevant legal or evidentiary argument, there was no advantag
Canada in any of the three cases highlighted in the previous sectio
abstain from arguing that Canada was effectively enforcin
environmental laws through comprehensive regulatory regimes. As
as the CEC, as an institution, is governed by the same written
unwritten) rules and conventions, it se
ONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this Article, we examined three cases in which citizen g
have filed submissions against Canada under Article 14 of the NAA
These cases show that Canada has consistently argued for a b
interpretation of “effective enforcement.” Appealing to a br
meaning of “effective enforcement” expands the range of argu
available to the responding Party and reduces the likelihood 
unfavo
ithin a set of institutional rules that create, in practice, an adver
process.
Of course, in drawing up these findings we examined onl
responses from Canada. This research is an initial attempt to unde
the SEM process from the perspectives of the Party signatories, u
Canada as the exemplar. Further research is needed to determine wh
the institutionalist theory is a persuasive way for understa
government responses to SEM submissions more generally, f
research is needed. If the Mexican and American Party responses to
their interactions with, the SEM process are consistent with our 
findings, it may speak to a need to rethink the architecture of the
process to encourage more constructive engagement by the NA
Parties. On the other hand, if a close examination of 
exican responses to citizen submissions over time reveals a dif
pattern, this may undermine an institutionalist explanation of Can
behaviour and suggest that a more complex dynamic is at work. 
As a final note of caution, these case studies, while useful,
only a partial picture of the Parties’ behaviour. Our study focus
behaviour that is a matter of public record. It is importan
acknowledge, however, that the SEM process also has a more “pri
side involving significant backroom maneuvring that for the most p
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ss should also be a priority and 
has the potential to offer significant insights. 
Parties.142 Studying the inner workings of the Council is import
fully understanding how Parties are behaving within these institu
rules. Accordingly, research into this dimension of the institution
politics of the CEC and the SEM proce
142 Tollefson, supra note118, at 176-78. 
25
Tollefson and Ho: Responses to Citizen Submissions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014
